Archive for the ‘Theodicy’ Category
Was My Loved One Unsaved When They Died?
Last week I posted a letter I wrote to a friend when her saved mother went home to heaven. Interesting how many people commented on my dealing with the death of a family member whose salvation was unsure or unknown. Kathy and I struggled through the death of her father now almost 20 years ago. I never encourage Christians to express certainty in these matters. Paul told Timothy “the Lord knows those that are His” (2Timothy 2:19). Only He knows the condition of a person’s heart or how they may have cried out even in their last moments like the thief on the cross. In any event, it is the uncertainty that burdens the heart of those who know the Lord. Here is a video where Kathy and I discuss settling into the sovereignty of God in a matter so immensely personal. I pray it is a blessing to those in similar circumstances.
God and Suffering: Is He Responsible? Part 3
As mentioned in my previous posts (part one and part two), the debates between determinism and indeterminism often circle around two primary issues. The first relates to the logical coherency of each position. That was the subject of my second post. But my real intent in writing on this subject relates to the second primary issue—the question of theodicy. How are we to reconcile the goodness and greatness of God with moral and natural evil? Which paradigm—determinism or indeterminism—better helps us (and those we pastor) navigate the tension between these two seemingly contradictory realities?
When faced with suffering, there is something inherent within the human psyche that causes us to look searchingly toward heaven. We know intuitively that our particular point of pain has not visited us independent of God’s divine rule. I recall watching a news clip in the aftermath of 9/11. Amidst the backdrop of the smoking buildings, a woman with tear-stained faced and choking voice asks, “Why God, why?” It’s a valid question, and one that’s not easily answered. And it illustrates well the reality that we all intuitively look to God as the ultimate source of all things—even suffering.
And it is at this particular point that I find indeterminism wanting. As a theodicy, indeterminism generally attempts to lessen the tension between God’s goodness and human suffering by appealing to moral freedom. It is through the wrong choices of free moral agents, we are told, that suffering has been introduced into the world. Well and good—even determinists would agree so far. But then indeterminists often (not always) make a logic-leap and conclude that when faced with suffering, we should look not to God, but rather man, Satan, and the random effects of a fallen world as the ultimate source. The subtle and (often not so-subtle) implication of indeterminism is that God has no causal relation to our suffering. Now I affirm human freedom. And I affirm that much of the suffering we experience is the direct result of creation’s choice to live independently of God. But one cannot simply sprinkle the pixie dust “free will” over all suffering and magically resolve the tension between God’s goodness and human suffering.
At the end of the day, there’s no way around it. God, by very nature of his being, is the ultimate “buck stops here” person in the universe. Nothing can happen apart from his divine sovereignty. He could have prevented the planes from crashing into the towers. But he chose not to. From massive natural disasters, to the death of the smallest creatures, God’s eye beholds all; his hand oversees all. And nothing happens apart from his divine counsel. Not even open theism, with it denial of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge, gets God off the hook. Even the open theist has to admit that God knew the intentions of the terrorists—if not from the dawn of time—then at least on the morning of 9/11. And still he chose not to intervene. The fact remains that creaturely freedom, however immediately the cause of suffering, does not operate outside the exhaustive scope of God’s sovereignty. The story of Job is a classic example.
As you will recall, God had placed a hedge of protection around Job. Satan asks for the hedge to be lifted and God agrees. Disaster after disaster befalls Job. Who is to blame for all of this? Well clearly the Sabean and Chaldean marauders bear their own responsibility. And clearly they were incited by Satan. But just as clearly, none of this calamity would have befallen Job apart from God’s ordained will. Certainly God wasn’t surprised at what happened to Job. He knew full well Satan’s intentions. And lying in the ashes of his estate Job correctly acknowledges that God is the ultimate source of both his blessing and his bane. “The Lord gives and the Lord takes away.” In fact, all the principle characters in the story acknowledge God as the ultimate source of Job’s suffering—his wife, his friends, the narrator, and most importantly, God himself. The driving question of the book is woven throughout the entire narrative, “Why would God bring such calamity upon a righteous man?” The indeterminist answer, with its strong appeal to moral freedom, would have us believe that God really wasn’t to blame. After all, it was the free moral choices of humans and demons that brought about Job’s suffering. But this is obviously short-sighted. How easily God could have cleared up all the angst with a simple, “Whoa there, everyone. You’ve got me all wrong. I’m not really to blame for any of this. This is just what happens in a world where free moral agents make sinful choices. Don’t look at me.” That might be a great response for a deist God, but that doesn’t work for the God of the Bible. God’s response, in contrast to the basic thrust of indeterminism, is, “I’m God and I have the right to do whatever I choose. Who are you to question me?”
So the main problem I have with indeterminism is that it’s resolution to the question of suffering really only moves the problem further down the street. Both classical indeterminism and open theism fail to reckon with a God who purposefully chooses to ordain suffering. We can debate about “allow” or “cause” (God does both—I prefer “ordained”) but at the end of the day, no point of suffering visits our life apart from God’s divine will. Even classical indeterminists must acknowledge this when pressed (and not even open theists can deny it, though they try).
As far as theodicy is concerned, I prefer determinism’s willingness to call a spade a spade. It acknowledges up front that God is the ultimate first mover, the One who ordains all things. Nothing happens apart from his divine will. At the end of the day, peace in the midst of suffering comes through submission to the divine will. It comes through trusting that God has a good reason for why he ordains what he ordains in relation to my life. And perhaps even more significantly, it acknowledges that he has the right to do so. Any theodicy that attempts too vigorously to wipe the blood off of God’s hands robs us of the rest that comes from resting submissively in the wisdom of God’s divine care. Such theodicies are an emotional quick fix, but they can’t satisfy the hurting heart in the end. Like Job, we find our ultimate peace in bowing before the mighty hand of a sovereign God who, beholden to no one, has the right to purposefully ordain all things—even suffering—for our good and his glory. Determinism reminds us that God owes us nothing, and yet has given us everything.
At the end of the day, I don’t get too ramped up about determinism and indeterminism. The church has debated this issue for 1700 years and God hasn’t seen fit to put an end to the discussion. If your determinism causes you to think that God “makes” you sin, or that God himself is the direct cause of moral evil, then you’re better off being an indeterminist. Just don’t forget in your indeterminism that God is the Ultimate behind every aspect of your life. Nothing happens to you that he has not purposefully permitted or caused. And if he has a purpose for our unique instances of suffering, we know that his purposes are wise and good, even when we can’t understand them. Don’t get caught up in an indeterminism that tells you don’t have to reckon with God in the midst of your suffering, or that evil visits your life randomly and without purpose (just rotten luck). You’d be better off as a determinist.
God and Suffering: Is He Responsible? Part 2
Continuing from this post… First, I’m a determinist. Second, this is a massive debate and one that we won’t do justice to in a few short blog posts. Third, I don’t think non-determinism is a heresy, nor do I believe non-determinism is subversive to the vital doctrines of the Christian faith. But I do think that non-determinism is mistaken, and that it can have negative consequences on faith and piety, particularly as it relates to the way it addresses human suffering. So here we go…
The Biblical Data
Of the quoting of Scripture there is no end, but here are a few of the more significant passages in support of determinism:
Ephesians 1:11 “In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will.”
Lamentations 3:37-38 “Who can speak and have it happen if the Lord has not decreed it? Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that both calamities and good things come?”
James 4:13-15 “Now listen, you who say, “Today or tomorrow we will go to this or that city, spend a year there, carry on business and make money.” Why, you do not even know what will happen tomorrow. What is your life? You are a mist that appears for a little while and then vanishes. Instead, you ought to say, “If it is the Lord’s will, we will live and do this or that.”
Psalm 139:16 “Your eyes saw my unformed body. All the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be.”
Matthew 10:29-30 “Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? Yet not one of them will fall to the ground apart from the will of your Father. And even the very hairs of your head are all numbered.”
Proverbs 16:33 “The lot is cast into the lap, but its every decision is from the LORD.”
Proof-texting a bunch of verses isn’t perhaps the most sophisticated way to make a theological point, but a quick look at the verses above do demonstrate that the biblical authors—both Old and New Testament—affirm the basic contours of the determinist paradigm. The Matthew 10 passage is perhaps one of the strongest for determinism, as Jesus is explicitly teaching that God’s sovereignty extends even to something as insignificant as the death of a bird, or to the number of the hairs on one’s head. The passage is all the more compelling in that Jesus is talking explicitly about the scope of God’s sovereignty—his comment is not a side comment unrelated to the main thrust of his speech. It’s very difficult to reconcile Jesus’ teaching here (and the overall tenor of his teaching at large) with non-determinism.
Beyond these passages, one can point to the scores of passages in support of unconditional predestination (most notably Ephesians 1, John 6, Romans 9). While not linked absolutely, if unconditional predestination is true, it’s hard to envision how it could exist in harmony with non-determinism.
Many of you referenced passages that demonstrate God brings about suffering (2 Kings 17:19-20, Micah 4:6, Hebrews 12:5-7, etc.). While in keeping with determinism, such passages do not prove determinism, only that God is at times directly responsible for calamity. Such passages fit (though perhaps not as comfortably) within a non-determinist framework as well.
Non-Determinism and the Logic of Determinism
Apart from the biblical data, there are two main rationales driving the non-determinist paradigm. The first is related to logic (i.e., determinism logically leads to fatalism, and a denial of moral responsibility, free will, etc.). The second reason relates to theodicy (i.e., determinism makes God morally culpable for suffering). My original intent in raising the issue was to address the effectiveness of non-determinism as a theodicy. In other words, does non-determinism really “wipe the blood off of God’s hands?” But nearly all of you who commented in favor of non-determinism did so for reasons related to the apparent logical implications of determinism. So before addressing the effectiveness of non-determinism as it relates to theodicy, let me say a brief (did I just say “brief”?) word about the logical critique of determinism.
For the non-determinist, determinism seems to inevitably lead to fatalism, eliminating the need for moral responsibility, and suggests that God is the direct cause of our evil actions. But this is a misread of the determinist position. As mentioned in the initial post, biblical determinists do not believe God moves humans like puppets on a string, or that we are not responsible for our choices. Informed biblical determinists affirm free will, recognize that our actions have consequences, and do not in any way suggest that God is the direct cause of human evil.
Determinism simply affirms that somehow, within the scope of God’s divine will, there is room for both human freedom and God’s specific sovereignty. Many determinists simply accept this as an article of faith—God says it, I believe it. So quoting scripture that affirms free will, or that demonstrates our actions have real moral consequences, does not undermine the determinist position. Determinists view such passages as coherent within their overall system. (What non-determinists need to produce are passages that explicitly deny that God is in control of all events, or affirm that much of history unfolds randomly. Such passages are in short supply). So ultimately, the debate is not between determinism and free will. Determinists affirm free will. Many deterministic theologians (Augustine, Thomas, Calvin, Luther, Edwards) have attempted (with varying degrees of success) to explain the relationship between the divine and human will. But regardless of the explanatory power of these syntheses, the fact of determinism is affirmed throughout Scripture, and—if nothing else—is a doctrine to be taken on faith, even if we cannot understand how determinism logically relates to moral responsibility and free will.
In many ways, this is not at all unlike the way in which we approach the doctrine of the Trinity. Who amongst us fully understands how God can be both three and one? Even the penetrating insights of the Fathers (Augustine, the two Gregs, Athanasius, etc.,) do not fully tap into or explain the depths of the triune nature of God. Yet the witness of Scripture leads to the inevitable holding together of these two truths. To reject the clear teaching of Scripture solely on the grounds that we cannot fully understand it, is to place human wisdom above the sacred page. Regarding the Trinity, both Jehovah Witnesses and Mormons are culpable in this regard. For both groups, Trinitarian teaching “logically” leads to tri-theism. Since the Bible clearly denies tri-theism, they conclude that God must not exist as a Trinity.
I encourage my non-determinist friends to avoid the same logical fallacy. Just because we may not be able to logically reconcile the fact of God’s specific sovereignty with human freedom, should not be grounds for dismissing the clear teaching of Scripture.
Having said the above however, I do believe there is a way to logically bring together God’s exhaustive sovereignty and authentic human freedom (see here). It’s a longer story than I will recount here, but Edwards’ Freedom of the Will is magisterial, as is Augustine’s On Grace and Free Will and On Rebuke and Grace. Frankly, I don’t find Calvin and Luther nearly as effective at this point, and I’m inclined to think that Luther’s Bondage of the Will is in some measure responsible for giving post-Reformation determinism a bad rap (see here and here). At the end of the day, all four theologians are arguing for the same basic position, but Luther and Calvin, given their rhetorical jousting with their Pelagian/semi-pelagian opponents, adopted some unfortunate semantics.
Can anyone think of any other passages—set within their proper context—that speak directly to this issue? Again, bear in mind that what we’re looking for are passages the make explicit statements about whether or not God’s sovereignty is general or specific. Ecclesiastes 9:11 is the only passage I can think of that points toward non-determinism.
God and Suffering: Is He Responsible or Not?
The subject of suffering and the goodness of God (theologians call this theodicy) is one of the more difficult issues that Christianity has to grapple with. The age old question of how a God who is infinitely wise, good, and powerful, could allow suffering is one that has occupied theologians and philosophers since the dawn of time. I was poking around the blogs the last few days and stumbled into a discussion regarding determinism and non-determinism, the two basic approaches to this issue. Rather than spend more time there, I figured I’d invest my energies here at home. First, let’s define terms.
Determinism teaches that everything that happens is in some sense God’s will. For determinists, this doesn’t mean that God likes everything that happens, nor does it mean that God directly intervenes in every circumstance (whether for good or evil). They acknowledge that much of God’s will occurs through indirect means. Nor do determinists deny the reality of free will (“free will” being defined as the capacity to make real moral choices), or deny that the choices of free moral agents have a real consequences. Determinism simply affirms that in some mysterious way, everything that happens (both good and evil) does so according to the unfolding of God’s ultimate plan. In short, God ordains everything.
Non-determinism, while not denying God’s sovereignty, teaches that God’s plan does not extend to every last detail. Many things happen “on their own” (for lack of a better way to say it). Non-determinists emphasize free will, and insist that much of what happens (particularly evil and suffering) is not the result of God’s foreordained plan, but rather is the result of human (or angelic/demonic) choice. In short, God doesn’t ordain everything.
Consequently, when it comes to suffering and evil, determinists readily acknowledge that God bears some measure of responsibility, in as much as all things occur within the scope of his ultimate plan. Non-determinist however, because they don’t think God’s plan is exhaustive, tend to argue that God doesn’t have responsibility for suffering and evil, placing the blame on human or demonic free will instead.
At the end of the day, this isn’t merely an intellectual exercise. Anyone who has faced a particularly challenging season of suffering, or experienced a particularly egregious evil, knows what it is to look toward heaven and ask “Why, God?” As those called to minister to others, we should have a well-formed perspective on this issue. We don’t have to have the ultimate answer, but we need to offer more than a blank stare and a “Uh, I’ve never thought about it before.”
I’ve got a follow-up post coming, but let’s take a roll call. In the comment box, state your position along with a few of the best scriptures to support it. I won’t state my own position yet, but you can get a hint by looking at the image of this post.
William Young’s The Shack
I recently read William Young’s The Shack. For a book with an initial marketing budget of only $300, its success has been nothing short of remarkable. It’s currently number one on the New York Times best seller’s list, and has gained a wide readership in the evangelical community. It’s endorsed by Michael W. Smith, and Eugene Peterson, among others.
The story opens with the abduction and brutal murder of “Mac’s” seven year old daughter. Four years later, Mac is invited by God to join him at the shack where his daughter’s murder was discovered. Mac accepts the invitation, and the remainder of the book is Mac’s experience with God at the shack. The book is essentially Young’s theodicy wrapped in a narrative. Young (consciously or not) follows Dostoevsky in tackling perhaps one of the greatest questions in theodicy—the suffering of children.
Young’s book has not been without controversy. Perhaps most immediately jarring is Young’s portrayal of God the Father as a large African American woman, and the Holy Spirit as an ethereal and diminutive Asian woman. (Jesus, mercifully, remains a Jewish handyman.) I’ve already made comments elsewhere about gender and the nature of God, so I wont belabor that point here. There are a number of troubling aspects to Young’s book (a tendency toward soteriological universalism, a sort of Trinitarian modalism, etc.), but I want to focus in on one particular issue, connected in part to Young’s decision to feminize God.
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